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Showing posts with label ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ukraine. Show all posts

Sunday, 5 April 2015

Russia's Love Affair With Europe's Far Right

A Cossak confronts a demonstrator (Associated Press)
Russia under President Vladimir Putin has forged an unusually aggressive foreign policy, a fact widely circulated in Western news media.  What has received little coverage outside of think tank and NGO circles however, is the full extent to which Putin and his inner circle have consolidated power within the country.  While military expenditures have increased significantly since Putin first took office in 1999, it has been accompanied by brutally effective asymmetrical tactics, which although successful at resolving internal conflicts like in Chechnya, have eroded civil liberties and subverted the democratic process to such a degree that in some aspects Russia now resembles North Korea as a crony-capitalist kleptocracy masquerading as a democracy.  Why has nothing or nobody, neither domestic nor otherwise, been able to put a significant dent in Putin’s seemingly imperial and authoritarian ambitions?

The 1990s were a tumultuous time for the then-nascent Russian Federation.  Still smarting from the breakup of the Soviet Union, which many blamed on the weakness of final Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, and plagued by civil strife, many in the country were understandably not optimistic about the future.  Radical privatization (dubbed “shock therapy”) of the Soviet era economy by Western-backed President Boris Yeltsin, whose supporters were pushing for rapid implementation of free market reforms, had resulted in the now infamous “cash for shares” fire sale of state-controlled assets at a fraction of their value to a small group of Soviet era political elite.  Global recession in 1998 exacerbated Russia’s economic woes, and brought the ruble to the precipice of collapse.  Yeltsin’s government underwent a period of significant political turmoil, with Yeltsin appointing several Prime Ministers in quick succession.

This was the scene in Russia when the world was first introduced to Vladimir Putin, then a largely unknown politician with roots in the foreign intelligence community.  Yeltsin spoke very highly of the technocrat-turned-Prime Minister, once even proclaiming Putin his heir presumptive.  Almost as if he was making good on a promise, Yeltsin abruptly resigned not much later, making Putin Acting President.  And so began a stranglehold on power which is now entering its 15th year.  During his time in office Putin has proven himself a master at populist politics, deftly weaving a network of support amongst seemingly disparate segments of Russian society.  By embracing revered institutions such as the military and Orthodox Church and tapping Russia’s proud military tradition, he has been able to propagate a myth that the country is under attack from a Western conspiracy; that the economic hardships of the 1990s was the result of seeking rapprochement with the West.  Putin has cast himself as a defender of the proverbial “Motherland” from foreign meddling, a theme increasingly prevalent in almost every facet of Russian policymaking today.  A “gay propaganda” law pushed through the Duma last year included clauses which seemed to insinuate that the Russian government viewed same-sex rights activists as foreign agitators.  Liberal minded opposition media outlets are regularly accused by what are likely Kremlin-backed “internet trolls” of parroting the American line. Conflating the fiercely nationalistic rhetoric of his supporters with “patriotism” has allowed Putin to virtually silence his opposition and justify actions within the purview of his agenda which otherwise would not be deemed acceptable.  Much like how the Cold War was a clash of ideologies, Putin has framed cold relations with the west, domestically at least, as a clash of values.  His brand of “leadership” has been lauded on Fox News, and provided as a contrast to President Obama’s purported weakness.  His methods have proven successful in stifling dissent and sending his popularity domestically soaring, but have left Russia isolated as the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals have alienated the West.  And yet for years Putin has quietly championed a policy that is only now beginning to bear fruit.

A peek inside the conference. (Associated Press)
What may turn out to be an auspicious day for Russian foreign policy began in decidedly unsexy fashion on a dreary Sunday last month.  The inaugural Russian Conservative Forum kicked off as leaders of North American and European right wing parties gathered at a Holiday Inn in downtown St. Petersburg to ostensibly advance the brand of global conservatism.  And yet there was quite possibly nary a discussion of conservatism to be had.  Delegate after delegate tripped over themselves to declare their disgust with the supposed “European” and “American” way of life, and all of its homosexual, multicultural, globalized trappings; it was no coincidence that each party was essentially parroting Vladimir Putin’s agenda.  While his name was not attached to the meeting, it was hard to ignore the influence his United Russia party exerted over the proceedings.  The assembled parties were an array of distasteful ideologues which included Greece’s borderline neo-Nazi Golden Dawn and Italy’s Forza Nuova, amongst the more vanilla attendees.  Guests at what amounted to a fascist pep rally also included Holocaust deniers, Nazi sympathizers, and a Russian skinhead notorious for beheading a puppy in the name of publicity.

It is not surprising that this gathering was reminiscent of “Communist International”, an association of communist parties founded as an instrument of Soviet control over international communism back in 1919, a period of hostile relations with the West.  Internationally isolated, Lenin and his bolsheviks turned to the forum as a means of finding support and allies abroad.  While the first congress was attended almost exclusively by Soviets and had few foreign delegates, the organization soon came to be recognized as the face of international communism.  Reports indicate that today Russia is engaging in a similar campaign of currying favour amongst ideologically friendly parties not just in neighbouring countries but in western Europe as well.  Confirming what various reports and papers say, the French right wing party Front National admitted to taking a roughly 9.5 million euro loan from a state controlled Russian bank.  The FN went on to make unprecedented gains in last year’s European Parliamentary elections, forming a substantial pro-Russia bloc within European Parliament, a decent return on investment.  Under Putin, the Kremlin has sought closer relations with an array of far right political parties, from Hungary’s Jobbik to Austria’s Freedom Party, to Belgium’s Vlaams Belang.  Many backed Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and last year declared the referendum on Russian annexation of Crimea legitimate which begs the question; why would such fiercely nationalistic parties seemingly contradict themselves by unquestionably following the lead of another country?

 The answer has less to do with fascism, Russia, or even conservatism and more to do with political marginalization and hatred of a U.S and EU pecking order they feel their own countries are beholden to.  Hence the defiant policymaking and disdainful regard for both displayed by Vladimir Putin has won him many admirers amongst Europe’s far right, and made Kremlin funds much more effective at achieving its goals.  Having smartly nurtured such parties for years, rampant anti-EU sentiment amongst many Europeans over the past year or so mean that Moscow is just now beginning to cash in on its far right strategy.  As these parties increasingly score significant victories at the polls, actions like further Russian sanctions or even renewal of current ones might eventually become quite difficult.  Russia didn’t create Europe’s far right but Moscow cultivating vocal allies willing to sing Russia’s praises in European Parliament and legislatures across the continent is a classic case of my enemy’s enemy is my friend.                

Sunday, 25 January 2015

Ukranian Redux

Aftermath of the offensive at Donetsk's airport
Earlier this summer I wrote about how Russia's role in the Ukrainian crisis had escalated to the point where the two countries were in a de facto state of war.  Since then various geopolitical events have threatened to overshadow the ongoing insurgency in eastern regions of the country, but a recent renewal of an offensive against rebels in Donetsk thrust the spotlight back on both the region and Russian interference in it.  In fact, some of the images and videos coming out of Mariupol, which was first attacked this past summer but has seen renewed fighting in recent days, are a disturbing insight into daily life under what is almost certainly Russian bombardment.
  


This dashcam video purports to show the driver narrowly escaping an artillery strike.  The truck in front was not as fortunate.  Other videos by residents clearly convey what seems to be a city under siege. (Update: As of the 25th of January, the video has been removed due to copyright)
   








There is increasingly strong evidence that the western sanctions regime and plunge in oil prices have done little to impede Russian ambitions in eastern Ukraine.  As the New York Times wrote:

"With the appearance in recent weeks of what NATO calls sophisticated Russian weapons systems, newly emboldened separatist leaders have abandoned all talk of a cease-fire."


  As my previous post on the subject stated, it is very likely that the Kremlin is backing insurgents in hopes of asserting some degree of influence over the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, host to the roads which serve as Russia's only land-based lifeline to Crimea.  A successful push along the southern coast would at best allow Russia to annex a swathe of territory which extends to breakaway regions of Moldova, or more plausibly, de facto Russian hegemony over the aforementioned territories within the framework of a federalized Ukraine.

Further implicating the Russian government were images released by the Ukrainian government which purported to show documents taken from captured Russian mercenaries.

"The National Security and Defence Council recently reported that Ukrainian artillery destroyed a column of Russian mercenaries near Donetsk airport and detained more than 10 of them" 
- Sheila Casey, State Department attache for Ukraine  

Despite strong words from the United States government, there doesn't seem to be a clear path forward.  With the United States and its allies slowly escalating their role in the fight against ISIS, there just doesn't seem to be much of an appetite for substantial action against the Russian government.  That said however, European Union economic sanctions on Russia come up for renewal soon, and if there was talk about easing them before, such talk is now gone.  Latvia and other eastern European states, citing a negotiated ceasfire signed in Minsk which was broken by rebels early last week, are in some cases now pressing for even harsher sanctions.  All the while, open warfare rages in the cities of Eastern Ukraine.  Some more photos of the recent devestation which left at least 30 dead:




 





Wednesday, 27 August 2014

Russia (Unofficially) Invaded Ukraine

As of this morning, reports have been filtering in from Ukraine that Russian forces have begun slowly entering Ukraine.  And unlike what unfolded on the Crimean Peninsula, these aren't just Russian troops with no insignias.  Vox reports that some of the assets Russia has moved into the region include "Russian artillery, Russian tanks, Russian-trained irregular forces, and even uniformed Russian soldiers".

At around the same time this was reported, Fox was able to report that pro-separatist forces had opened a new front in the conflict by attacking the strategically important city of Novoazovsk, a resort town of approximately 12,000 which borders Crimea.  Leaving aside questions of how a group who just a few weeks ago was on the brink of defeat in Donetsk now have the logistics and manpower to attack elsewhere, what makes this move suspect is that Novoazovsk, should it be taken would leave a clear path to Mariupol, a city through which runs a road that serves as the only land connection Crimea has (via Ukraine) with the rest of Russia. Photographs of the besieged town showed plumes of smoke rising from the eastern Ukrainian city (pictured), due to what residents described as a heavy artillery barrage.  Interestingly enough, a quick Youtube search reveals that back in March when Russia began the process of annexing Crimea, it brought along with it heavy artillery not unlike those which the pro separatist "rebels" are currently pounding Novoazovsk with.

Shelling in Novoazovsk (Associated Press)
Taken in tandem with a videos that surfaced which purported to show the ten Russian paratroopers Ukraine had claimed to have captured admitting to being Russian military personnel under orders to invade Ukraine, it should leave no doubt in the minds of NATO that there is much more to Russia's role in this conflict than the bystander it claims to be.  And thankfully, that seems to be the case.  The Canadian government has taken quite a hawkish position on seeming Russian interference in the affairs of Ukraine, culminating in sending military aid earlier this month.  It made its position on this latest incursion known immediately, issuing a tersely worded tweet earlier today:


Meanwhile the United States, which has has been letting Germany take the lead on Ukraine as of late, has not been totally neglecting the crisis unfolding there.  As the New York Times reported:

"Analysis by Western officials indicates that Russia is orchestrating a multipronged offensive against Ukrainian forces. Russian forces have been trying to help separatists in eastern Ukraine break the siege of Luhansk, one of the main rebel-held cities, and open a corridor to another, Donetsk, from the Russian border"

The United States role can be best described as the good cop to Canada's bad cop, with its more nuanced criticism of Russia and focus on gathering intelligence to discredit Russian claims of non-interference in the country.  In fact, earlier today the US finally broke their relative silence on Ukraine, in a statement accusing Russia of reinforcing faltering rebel efforts. "These incursions indicate a Russian-directed counteroffensive is likely underway in Donetsk and Luhansk," State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki told reporters. And so given the recent escalation in the conflict, expect an announcement soon from the President on potential military aid in the form of advisors and equipment for the Ukrainian military, as well as a possible beefing up of NATO presence within the borders of regional members.  But make no mistake, Russia and Ukraine have all but formally gone to war, with Russia seeking to strengthen its grip on the vital defence industries present in Eastern Ukraine, as well as carve out a land strip connecting it to the currently largely isolated Crimea.  Should they succeed, it would destabilize an already precarious situation in Ukraine, and would prevent a democratic government from exerting control over all of its territories.  

But interestingly enough, Russia's continued "whodunit" approach to engaging with its neighbours may be having negative ramifications for its foreign policy ambitions.  Putin's Eurasian Economic Union pet project is starting to look like an abject failure.  Despite all the transformations this conflict has undergone, its important to remember it was first ignited by then-President Yanukovych moving towards joining Putin's attempt at a counterbalance to the EU.  Since then, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all been reluctant to draw themselves into Russia's sphere of influence again after seeing it's messy divorce with once-close ally Ukraine, and even those who have agreed to ascend are causing Russia significant headaches.  Kazakh fears over potential Russian aggression have lead to the severing of several mutual defence treaties, and it forging its own foreign policy route.  It blocked Armenia, a major recipient of Russian aid, from ascending, and along with Belarus refused to join Russia in banning food imports from the West.  It'll be interesting to see if in the long term the antagonism Russia is breeding ends up manifesting into something more than just a healthy skepticism of Russian intentions, but right now it is imperative that Western countries come to the aid of Ukraine before Russia is able to tear it in two.

Sunday, 23 March 2014

Zero Sum Game: Putin's Imperial Crusade

Russian troops in Crimea
Things have moved very fast in Crimea.  Following the results of a widely condemned referendum in the Crimea where results showed that over 97% of voters chose to secede from Ukraine and instead join the Russian Federation.  While the results were almost immediately disavowed by a large majority of the international community, claiming that the referendum was conducted under intimidation and suppression by both Russian troops and the Crimean (as well as those from other nations) militias loyal to them, that did little to stop Russia from recognizing it.  Since then, Russia has solidified its de facto control of the region, with Ukraine withdrawing its 25,000 troops from the peninsula in an implicit sign that Kyiv recognizes its rather limited ability to assert control over the breakaway region.  The very next day, Russia’s lower house voted in favour of formally annexing it.  With Crimea in the Russian camp for the long term at the very least, what implications does it have for the rest of the former Soviet sphere?

Putin’s obsession with empire building is well documented.  Reasserting control over the former Soviet sphere has been an increasingly prominent policy goal of the Kremlin over the past decade.  But any doubts that remained should have been dispelled by Putin’s March 18th address to Parliament.  Denouncing what he deemed a centuries-long conspiracy by Western powers to suppress Russia, Putin heralded the dawn of a new era of Russian dominance, which was later christened by the Duma the very next day, who voted in favour of annexing the Crimean peninsula.  With its new doctrine of intervention on behalf of ethnic Russians that worked so successfully in the Ukrainian crisis, where will Putin go next?  Many point to Transnistria, a heavily industrialized breakaway region of the ethnic hodgepodge that is Moldova.  In response to the Duma vote to annex Crimea, the Transnistrian Parliament in turn passed a motion  to join the Russian Federation.  Some speculate that Russia may turn to Estonia and Latvia, both countries with substantial Russian populations in hopes of bringing them into its orbit or at the very least carving out Russian exclaves within them.  Regardless of whatever move the Kremlin does make, it’s fairly certain they will not stop with the Crimea.  Despite drawing strong condemnation from the international community and potentially alienating UN ally China, the biggest provocation in recent memory drew little in the way of firm consequences for Russia, and damaging sanctions do not seem likely any time soon.  Europe is heavily reliant upon Russia for energy, and that will not change anytime soon especially as many European countries move away from nuclear energy.  Russian-American trade is so diminutive that sanctions would have a rather limited impact.

So how do the events of recent weeks affect Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions?  The Russian dominated antithesis to the EU, the Eurasian Union, is set to become reality on New Year’s Day next year, with membership currently consisting of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, with Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all potentially joining as well.  While Russia’s annexation of Crimea provides it with the framework to take over other so-called “frozen” conflict zones, it also runs the risk of alienating other former Soviet states who may have been eyeing the union with wary interest.  While some states such as Poland and Lithuania voiced their desire to remain outside of any sphere of Russian influence by forging closer ties to NATO and the EU, countries such as Moldova and Armenia that could be compelled to join may look elsewhere, as evidenced by the rather lukewarm statements they issued in response to the annexation vote.  Russia’s newfound aggression is not the spontaneous combustion of a cocktail of nationalistic fervour at home and instability abroad but rather the culmination of a decade’s worth of meticulous planning.  Putin orchestrated various factors to create “the perfect storm” that would enable him to push his foreign policy agenda of restoring Russian domination in the region.   Harnessing the influence that the Russian Orthodox Church wielded over the population  in order to stoke nationalistic sentiments, rebuilding the Russian military as an effective fighting machine with a global reach, and influencing the affairs of other states in the post-Soviet sphere were all elements which enabled what unfolded on the peninsula to happen.  Putin took a calculated risk by invading Crimea, as its capture was an easy sell to the international community due to its traditional history as part of Russia as well as a litmus test of western appetites for Russian provocations.  It could not have hoped for a better result, and now count on the consolidation of Russian interests in the region to accelerate.

The picture does look particularly bleak, but what should the west do?  Sanctions may not be as effective as they have been in Iran (until recently), but the U.S and its allies do have a unique asset in NATO.  While it has seen a decade of general neglect, the 28-member military alliance is maybe the one tool in the U.S’s arsenal that Putin does fear.  When Poland, Latvia and the Czech Republic joined in 1999, Russia was wary of what it perceived to be creeping western influence beginning to encroach upon its own sphere of influence.  The U.S has dispatched naval forces to the Black Sea and a few days ago along with France announced it was sending sending air assets to Poland.  John McCain has stated that he wanted to see military equipment sent to Ukraine, and with leaders of former eastern bloc states becoming increasingly nervous about Russian activities, such a move would be easily defensible.  In fact, it might be prudent as ten day old Russian military exercises have led to a military buildup that NATO’s top commander described as “very, very sizable and very, very ready."  While it is desirable to avoid a “hot war”, it should not be avoided at all costs, lest the dovish policies of blind appeasement that failed spectacularly in the 1930s make a return.  While the situations are in no way parallels, there are some disturbing similarities that offer insight into how a potential conflict could be avoided.  

While on paper NATO countries (excluding the U.S and Canada) spent $269.736 billion on military expenditures and account for a significant chunk of global military spending, this is set to change with cuts to the militaries of most members.  The United States accounts for 70% NATO spending, and with some European members cutting spending up to 40%, it isn’t exactly unusual to hear some of the more fiscally conservative members of Congress complaining about how their European allies have been shoving the burden of defending them increasingly on the United States.  In the meantime, Putin has gone ahead with a vast and sweeping modernization program for the military that is estimated to cost somewhere in the neighbourhood of $770 billion dollars and will oversee the expansion of the air force, navy, special forces and intelligence capabilities.  While there has been some criticism about the realisticness of such an ambitious plan, such as the effect of corruption that is almost synonymous with massive projects in Russia, it nevertheless demonstrates the sincerity of Putin’s pledge to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.  Hearkening back to 80 years ago, one of the biggest draws of the upstart Nazi Party was its goal of restoring Germany to its former stature as a world power.  While illegal rearmament had begun from almost the moment that the Treaty of Versailles was signed, it was ramped up in the 30s under the direction of Hjalmar Schacht (notably never a member of the Nazi Party and later jailed at Dachau), the Reich Minister of Economics at the time.  Schacht successfully managed to create dummy companies that shielded rearmament efforts from prying Allied eyes.  From a force that was limited to a 100,000 ground army with no tanks, no air force and a navy of just 6 ships with no submarines, it was transformed in short order into a well oiled military machine that 20 years later would roll across Europe in a deadly “lightning war”, or Blitzkrieg.  

Now there are some stark differences in these situations (namely the Treaty of Versailles), but remaining oblivious to the military buildup occurring to the east is not a plausible or realistic plan of action for European countries seeking to avoid conflict.  While placing boots on the ground would be an obvious provocation and carries the risk of spilling over into armed conflict, NATO allies should begin by pledging to immediately provide Ukrainian forces with both arms and training in how to use them, as well as signing contracts for modern naval and air assets that could be paid for at a later date.  Although a UN mandate seems unlikely thanks to Russia’s status as a veto-wielding power in the Security Council, NATO forces should be deployed under its banner nonetheless with the sole purpose of securing the borders and maintaining the territorial integrity of countries who specifically have requested its assistance.  It may be met with protest from countries such as India who seem content to be willfully blind to the realities in the region, but ensuring that current tensions do not spill over into wider conflict demands that a principled stand against a Putin regime that has set its sights on nothing less than restoring the clout its old Soviet empire wielded be taken.  If Ukraine is further divided, it does not bode well for Eastern Europe at large.