Libya is Obama's Mess To Own

Libya's Lost Generation 

As his administration enters its twilight years, President Obama certainly has several key policy pieces he can proudly tout as his legacy; healthcare reform that eluded the Clinton administration, a resurgent economy as well as wins on several social issues.  Even his record on foreign policy, relatively muddled as it may be, holds several moves which in time could prove to be shrewdly negotiated wins.  The same cannot be said however, for how this administration has handled its involvement in the Libyan Civil War.  Given the renewed questions about potential American involvement in Syria due to Russia ratcheting up its support of the Assad regime, the time is now ripe to revisit the country’s last foray into a messy civil conflict in the region and see what lessons can be learned.    

in 2011, what began as a string of popular protests against the oppressive rule of Libya’s longtime strongman Moammar Gaddafi, inspired by similar movements in nearby countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain that later came to be collectively dubbed as the “Arab Spring”, turned bloody.  As the chorus calling for extensive reforms grew louder, Gaddafi initially cracked down in brutal fashion.  Perhaps remembering what happened the last time the West plead ignorance to flagrant atrocities being committed right under its nose, the United States led an effort to secure NATO a UN Security Council mandate to intervene by means of a no-fly zone in hopes of averting a potential humanitarian catastrophe.  President Obama would later say “We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi -a city nearly the size of Charlotte- could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.”  And so not long after receiving authorization in a tenuous vote where both the Chinese and Russians were convinced to abstain, NATO warplanes made the first bombing sorties over Libya.  Already facing pressure from a fractious alliance of several until-recently-largely-suppressed tribal and militant groups, now being armed by sympathetic countries both in the Gulf and the West (via Qatar), Gaddafi's forces didn’t stand a chance.  In a matter of months the tables turned dramatically.  By October, Tripoli had been overrun and Gaddafi summarily executed by a bullet to the head.  

Western analysis of the situation in the immediate aftermath of Gaddafi being deposed declared the intervention a success, having prevented large scale atrocities and seen the ultimate toppling of, by some accounts, a very brutal dictator.  The US’s representative to NATO even went so far as to pen an article where he declared the alliance’s involvement a victory and went on to call it a “model intervention”.  Now four years later this cheery assessment rings hollow, when the country’s internationally recognized government is now unable to exert control over its own ports and oil fields, Islamists and tribal groups run roughshod over large swathes of its territory and Libyan weapons ransacked from its armories have turned up in other hotbeds for Islamist terrorism across the region.

But before turning an eye towards the extent to which radicals have infiltrated the political and social fabric of Libya itself, it is important to consider the ripple effect of toppling Gaddafi, and what role it played in nurturing the Islamist insurgencies many other countries in the region are now grappling with.  Perhaps the most jarring example of illicit weapon flows from Libya fueling conflicts abroad however, can be found in Mali.  The first wave was caused by ethnic Tuaregs within the country’s security services taking their weapons and fleeing to Mali following the fall of the regime.  Hoping to assist the Tuareg minority in that country launch an insurrection of their own, it instead was hijacked by the Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine with whom they had formed an uneasy truce in hopes of driving Malian forces from the north of the country.  Indirectly or not, the Libyan rebels played a key role in the war, allowing weapons to be funnelled out of the country through Tunisia and Niger and into Northern Mali.  While ISIS made waves last summer when it declared the establishment of a “Caliphate” in parts of Iraq and Syria, Mali quietly gained the notorious distinction of being host to the largest swathe of sovereign territory controlled by a terrorist organization.    

And to make matters worse, it does not simply stop there; Libyan weapons have also been smuggled through Egypt and Lebanon and into the hands of militants everywhere from the Gaza Strip to Syria.  Of particular concern to arms control experts is the widespread proliferation of man-portable air defence systems, often referred to as MANPADs.  Light enough to be carried by individual infantry, they are capable of shooting down anything from a helicopter to a commercial airliner.  Approximately 15,000 went missing in the aftermath of the war, and a buyback effort by the United States has only managed to secure roughly 5000.  Perhaps even more frighteningly, a report on the subject added that several hundred of the missiles were still completely unaccounted for, potentially having wound up in the hands of groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria or Hamas in Gaza.  And any doubts regarding this assertion were shattered during 2012’s Operation Returning Echo, when an IDF helicopter was nearly shot down by a missile that subsequent investigations determined originated from Libya.  More recently, militants in Egypt successfully shot down a military helicopter using the missile.  Other Libyan arms have surfaced in arms markets frequently used by terror groups in places such as Yemen and Somalia.  That NATO intervened without seriously considering the intentions of the groups it would implicitly be backing, or made any effort to secure Gaddafi’s arsenals, instead trusting that the militias would agree to unilaterally disarm was foolish and naive on the part of the Obama administration and its allies.  Of course all the blame for what transpired cannot be placed upon the United States, for Gaddafi’s weapons represented just one stream of armaments that flowed out of the country following the war.  NATO’s mission was imperilled from the get-go by the actions of its supposed allies, who purchased billions in weapons for various militant groups that later went on to fuel other conflicts across the region.  It became incredibly difficult for participating states to credibly state that the reason for intervention was purely humanitarian in nature when moves by allies widely seen as being done in concert with NATO efforts were blatantly aimed at propping up one side in the civil war.  The Russian ambassador to the UN made note of this when he said “NATO forces frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called ‘no-fly zone’ over it they started bombing it too.”  Whether NATO expanded its mandate at the behest of Gulf state allies or if they intended to take sides in the conflict all along is up for debate, but regardless, doing so enabled the nearly uninterrupted flow of weapons to Islamist terror groups, who once rid of Gaddafi (a strong ally with regards to U.S counterterrorism efforts in the region) were now free to pursue their goal of fomenting instability in the region armed with billions in newly acquired weapons.

Due to the efforts on the part of the UAE and Qatar, who in defiance of an arms embargo supplied arms to several militias, most of whom later refused to disarm once the conflict was over, a fertile breeding ground for terrorist groups was created.  Many of these very same fighters and militias would go on to play significant roles in other terror hotspots in nearby countries, affiliating themselves with groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIL.  Qatar in particular, who continued to funnel arms to Libyan militias as late as September 2014 (two years after the attack on the American compound in Benghazi by a group nominally supported by Qatar), seemingly took no lessons away from Libya, for they continue to arm radical groups in Syria, constructing a potential post-Assad power paradigm that is increasingly likely be eerily similar to that which we now have in Libya.

The government which supplanted Gaddafi’s regime in the years since its fall can only be considered an unmitigated disaster.  This is the case for several reasons, chief amongst them being the totally outsized role played by the tribal militias who deposed Gaddafi.  As previously mentioned, upon the war’s conclusion just about every militia, rather than disarming, instead turned towards consolidating and expanding their territorial holdings.  As a result, the interim National Transitional Council that was appointed to oversee a speedy return to free elections had its hands tied.  Its largest source of funds, oil, was virtually cut off as the majority of the country’s ports, fields and refineries were in the hands of militias who refused the NTC’s demand that they disarm and stand for election if they wished to play a role in government.  Entrusting the momentous task of implementing regime change to a group of insurgents that the West did not seem to fully understand backfired spectacularly, especially when you consider how atrocities against civilians have still continued post-Gaddafi, with hospitals being the site of kidnappings and rocket attacks.    

 The narrative widely peddled in the media as to why intervention was necessary in the first place claimed that Benghazi was the site of an impending massacre by Gaddafi’s  forces.  And yet reexamining the regime’s actions in the months before intervention reveals a portrait of relative restraint.  While the actions taken by Gaddafi’s forces would not have been acceptable from Western forces, intervening only seemed to worsen the situation.  Initial reports on casualties seemed to vindicate NATO action; in September 2011 rebels claimed that 30,000 had been killed.  However the NTC’s subsequent investigations following the war poked several holes in this figure, revising the number down to 11,500 including regime and rebel fighters, as well as missing persons.  In the years since the conflict however, supposedly a period of peaceful transition towards democracy, 2012 and 2013 both saw low level conflict that is estimated to have killed roughly 500 a year.  2014 essentially saw the return of open civil war, and with it the deaths of over 2,750, three years removed from a supposedly successful intervention.

“Throw away your weapons, exactly like your brothers in Ajdabiya and other places did. They laid down their arms and they are safe. We never pursued them at all.”

As the legacy of Western intervention in the country becomes more clear, so is just what really happened.  An alternative narrative has emerged, that Libyan nationals in Switzerland, sympathetic to the rebel forces who were on their last legs in Benghazi, leaked false information pertaining to a potential massacre of the besieged troops and civilians in the city.  Regardless of how true this claim was, their plea for help worked; NATO swiftly intervened and completely reversed the tide of the war, handing the rebels who were previously on the brink of defeat a stunning victory.  Lending credibility to this story are the numbers from Syria.  Before the Libyan intervention commenced in March of 2011, protests had been largely nonviolent and the regime response, criminal as it was, had not yet morphed into the all out war on its citizens that it would soon become.  But by that summer, it is not unlikely that the Syrian opposition took up armed insurrection in hopes of provoking a regime response that would trigger NATO involvement similar to what transpired in Libya.  What did occur was a drawn out war with no end in sight four years after the fact.  And now as the Russians seem intent on taking a more active role in the war there, it's concerning that the only lesson President Obama took away from Libya was that the United States and its allies didn’t intervene enough.  In an interview with the New York Times last year he said “I think we underestimated the need to come in full force.  If you’re going to do this there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies.”  If NATO had more carefully studied the conflict it entered, there might not have been any need to rebuild in the first place.  

Russia's Love Affair With Europe's Far Right

A Cossak confronts a demonstrator (Associated Press)

Russia under President Vladimir Putin has forged an unusually aggressive foreign policy, a fact widely circulated in Western news media.  What has received little coverage outside of think tank and NGO circles however, is the full extent to which Putin and his inner circle have consolidated power within the country.  While military expenditures have increased significantly since Putin first took office in 1999, it has been accompanied by brutally effective asymmetrical tactics, which although successful at resolving internal conflicts like in Chechnya, have eroded civil liberties and subverted the democratic process to such a degree that in some aspects Russia now resembles North Korea as a crony-capitalist kleptocracy masquerading as a democracy.  Why has nothing or nobody, neither domestic nor otherwise, been able to put a significant dent in Putin’s seemingly imperial and authoritarian ambitions?

The 1990s were a tumultuous time for the then-nascent Russian Federation.  Still smarting from the breakup of the Soviet Union, which many blamed on the weakness of final Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, and plagued by civil strife, many in the country were understandably not optimistic about the future.  Radical privatization (dubbed “shock therapy”) of the Soviet era economy by Western-backed President Boris Yeltsin, whose supporters were pushing for rapid implementation of free market reforms, had resulted in the now infamous “cash for shares” fire sale of state-controlled assets at a fraction of their value to a small group of Soviet era political elite.  Global recession in 1998 exacerbated Russia’s economic woes, and brought the ruble to the precipice of collapse.  Yeltsin’s government underwent a period of significant political turmoil, with Yeltsin appointing several Prime Ministers in quick succession.

This was the scene in Russia when the world was first introduced to Vladimir Putin, then a largely unknown politician with roots in the foreign intelligence community.  Yeltsin spoke very highly of the technocrat-turned-Prime Minister, once even proclaiming Putin his heir presumptive.  Almost as if he was making good on a promise, Yeltsin abruptly resigned not much later, making Putin Acting President.  And so began a stranglehold on power which is now entering its 15th year.  During his time in office Putin has proven himself a master at populist politics, deftly weaving a network of support amongst seemingly disparate segments of Russian society.  By embracing revered institutions such as the military and Orthodox Church and tapping Russia’s proud military tradition, he has been able to propagate a myth that the country is under attack from a Western conspiracy; that the economic hardships of the 1990s was the result of seeking rapprochement with the West.  Putin has cast himself as a defender of the proverbial “Motherland” from foreign meddling, a theme increasingly prevalent in almost every facet of Russian policymaking today.  A “gay propaganda” law pushed through the Duma last year included clauses which seemed to insinuate that the Russian government viewed same-sex rights activists as foreign agitators.  Liberal minded opposition media outlets are regularly accused by what are likely Kremlin-backed “internet trolls” of parroting the American line. Conflating the fiercely nationalistic rhetoric of his supporters with “patriotism” has allowed Putin to virtually silence his opposition and justify actions within the purview of his agenda which otherwise would not be deemed acceptable.  Much like how the Cold War was a clash of ideologies, Putin has framed cold relations with the west, domestically at least, as a clash of values.  His brand of “leadership” has been lauded on Fox News, and provided as a contrast to President Obama’s purported weakness.  His methods have proven successful in stifling dissent and sending his popularity domestically soaring, but have left Russia isolated as the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals have alienated the West.  And yet for years Putin has quietly championed a policy that is only now beginning to bear fruit.

A peek inside the conference. (Associated Press)

What may turn out to be an auspicious day for Russian foreign policy began in decidedly unsexy fashion on a dreary Sunday last month.  The inaugural Russian Conservative Forum kicked off as leaders of North American and European right wing parties gathered at a Holiday Inn in downtown St. Petersburg to ostensibly advance the brand of global conservatism.  And yet there was quite possibly nary a discussion of conservatism to be had.  Delegate after delegate tripped over themselves to declare their disgust with the supposed “European” and “American” way of life, and all of its homosexual, multicultural, globalized trappings; it was no coincidence that each party was essentially parroting Vladimir Putin’s agenda.  While his name was not attached to the meeting, it was hard to ignore the influence his United Russia party exerted over the proceedings.  The assembled parties were an array of distasteful ideologues which included Greece’s borderline neo-Nazi Golden Dawn and Italy’s Forza Nuova, amongst the more vanilla attendees.  Guests at what amounted to a fascist pep rally also included Holocaust deniers, Nazi sympathizers, and a Russian skinhead notorious for beheading a puppy in the name of publicity.

It is not surprising that this gathering was reminiscent of “Communist International”, an association of communist parties founded as an instrument of Soviet control over international communism back in 1919, a period of hostile relations with the West.  Internationally isolated, Lenin and his bolsheviks turned to the forum as a means of finding support and allies abroad.  While the first congress was attended almost exclusively by Soviets and had few foreign delegates, the organization soon came to be recognized as the face of international communism.  Reports indicate that today Russia is engaging in a similar campaign of currying favour amongst ideologically friendly parties not just in neighbouring countries but in western Europe as well.  Confirming what various reports and papers say, the French right wing party Front National admitted to taking a roughly 9.5 million euro loan from a state controlled Russian bank.  The FN went on to make unprecedented gains in last year’s European Parliamentary elections, forming a substantial pro-Russia bloc within European Parliament, a decent return on investment.  Under Putin, the Kremlin has sought closer relations with an array of far right political parties, from Hungary’s Jobbik to Austria’s Freedom Party, to Belgium’s Vlaams Belang.  Many backed Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and last year declared the referendum on Russian annexation of Crimea legitimate which begs the question; why would such fiercely nationalistic parties seemingly contradict themselves by unquestionably following the lead of another country?

 The answer has less to do with fascism, Russia, or even conservatism and more to do with political marginalization and hatred of a U.S and EU pecking order they feel their own countries are beholden to.  Hence the defiant policymaking and disdainful regard for both displayed by Vladimir Putin has won him many admirers amongst Europe’s far right, and made Kremlin funds much more effective at achieving its goals.  Having smartly nurtured such parties for years, rampant anti-EU sentiment amongst many Europeans over the past year or so mean that Moscow is just now beginning to cash in on its far right strategy.  As these parties increasingly score significant victories at the polls, actions like further Russian sanctions or even renewal of current ones might eventually become quite difficult.  Russia didn’t create Europe’s far right but Moscow cultivating vocal allies willing to sing Russia’s praises in European Parliament and legislatures across the continent is a classic case of my enemy’s enemy is my friend.                

Ukranian Redux

Aftermath of the offensive at Donetsk's airport

Earlier this summer I wrote about how Russia's role in the Ukrainian crisis had escalated to the point where the two countries were in a de facto state of war.  Since then various geopolitical events have threatened to overshadow the ongoing insurgency in eastern regions of the country, but a recent renewal of an offensive against rebels in Donetsk thrust the spotlight back on both the region and Russian interference in it.  In fact, some of the images and videos coming out of Mariupol, which was first attacked this past summer but has seen renewed fighting in recent days, are a disturbing insight into daily life under what is almost certainly Russian bombardment.

  

This dashcam video purports to show the driver narrowly escaping an artillery strike.  The truck in front was not as fortunate.  Other videos by residents clearly convey what seems to be a city under siege. (Update: As of the 25th of January, the video has been removed due to copyright)
   

There is increasingly strong evidence that the western sanctions regime and plunge in oil prices have done little to impede Russian ambitions in eastern Ukraine.  As the New York Times wrote:

"With the appearance in recent weeks of what NATO calls sophisticated Russian weapons systems, newly emboldened separatist leaders have abandoned all talk of a cease-fire."

  As my previous post on the subject stated, it is very likely that the Kremlin is backing insurgents in hopes of asserting some degree of influence over the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, host to the roads which serve as Russia's only land-based lifeline to Crimea.  A successful push along the southern coast would at best allow Russia to annex a swathe of territory which extends to breakaway regions of Moldova, or more plausibly, de facto Russian hegemony over the aforementioned territories within the framework of a federalized Ukraine.

Further implicating the Russian government were images released by the Ukrainian government which purported to show documents taken from captured Russian mercenaries.

"The National Security and Defence Council recently reported that Ukrainian artillery destroyed a column of Russian mercenaries near Donetsk airport and detained more than 10 of them" 
- Sheila Casey, State Department attache for Ukraine  

Despite strong words from the United States government, there doesn't seem to be a clear path forward.  With the United States and its allies slowly escalating their role in the fight against ISIS, there just doesn't seem to be much of an appetite for substantial action against the Russian government.  That said however, European Union economic sanctions on Russia come up for renewal soon, and if there was talk about easing them before, such talk is now gone.  Latvia and other eastern European states, citing a negotiated ceasfire signed in Minsk which was broken by rebels early last week, are in some cases now pressing for even harsher sanctions.  All the while, open warfare rages in the cities of Eastern Ukraine.  Some more photos of the recent devestation which left at least 30 dead:

 

Russia (Unofficially) Invaded Ukraine

As of this morning, reports have been filtering in from Ukraine that Russian forces have begun slowly entering Ukraine.  And unlike what unfolded on the Crimean Peninsula, these aren't just Russian troops with no insignias.  Vox reports that some of the assets Russia has moved into the region include "Russian artillery, Russian tanks, Russian-trained irregular forces, and even uniformed Russian soldiers".

At around the same time this was reported, Fox was able to report that pro-separatist forces had opened a new front in the conflict by attacking the strategically important city of Novoazovsk, a resort town of approximately 12,000 which borders Crimea.  Leaving aside questions of how a group who just a few weeks ago was on the brink of defeat in Donetsk now have the logistics and manpower to attack elsewhere, what makes this move suspect is that Novoazovsk, should it be taken would leave a clear path to Mariupol, a city through which runs a road that serves as the only land connection Crimea has (via Ukraine) with the rest of Russia. Photographs of the besieged town showed plumes of smoke rising from the eastern Ukrainian city (pictured), due to what residents described as a heavy artillery barrage.  Interestingly enough, a quick Youtube search reveals that back in March when Russia began the process of annexing Crimea, it brought along with it heavy artillery not unlike those which the pro separatist "rebels" are currently pounding Novoazovsk with.

Shelling in Novoazovsk (Associated Press)

Taken in tandem with a videos that surfaced which purported to show the ten Russian paratroopers Ukraine had claimed to have captured admitting to being Russian military personnel under orders to invade Ukraine, it should leave no doubt in the minds of NATO that there is much more to Russia's role in this conflict than the bystander it claims to be.  And thankfully, that seems to be the case.  The Canadian government has taken quite a hawkish position on seeming Russian interference in the affairs of Ukraine, culminating in sending military aid earlier this month.  It made its position on this latest incursion known immediately, issuing a tersely worded tweet earlier today:

Geography can be tough. Here’s a guide for Russian soldiers who keep getting lost & ‘accidentally’ entering #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/RF3H4IXGSp
— Canada at NATO (@CanadaNATO) August 27, 2014

Meanwhile the United States, which has has been letting Germany take the lead on Ukraine as of late, has not been totally neglecting the crisis unfolding there.  As the New York Times reported:

"Analysis by Western officials indicates that Russia is orchestrating a multipronged offensive against Ukrainian forces. Russian forces have been trying to help separatists in eastern Ukraine break the siege of Luhansk, one of the main rebel-held cities, and open a corridor to another, Donetsk, from the Russian border"

The United States role can be best described as the good cop to Canada's bad cop, with its more nuanced criticism of Russia and focus on gathering intelligence to discredit Russian claims of non-interference in the country.  In fact, earlier today the US finally broke their relative silence on Ukraine, in a statement accusing Russia of reinforcing faltering rebel efforts. "These incursions indicate a Russian-directed counteroffensive is likely underway in Donetsk and Luhansk," State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki told reporters. And so given the recent escalation in the conflict, expect an announcement soon from the President on potential military aid in the form of advisors and equipment for the Ukrainian military, as well as a possible beefing up of NATO presence within the borders of regional members.  But make no mistake, Russia and Ukraine have all but formally gone to war, with Russia seeking to strengthen its grip on the vital defence industries present in Eastern Ukraine, as well as carve out a land strip connecting it to the currently largely isolated Crimea.  Should they succeed, it would destabilize an already precarious situation in Ukraine, and would prevent a democratic government from exerting control over all of its territories.  

But interestingly enough, Russia's continued "whodunit" approach to engaging with its neighbours may be having negative ramifications for its foreign policy ambitions.  Putin's Eurasian Economic Union pet project is starting to look like an abject failure.  Despite all the transformations this conflict has undergone, its important to remember it was first ignited by then-President Yanukovych moving towards joining Putin's attempt at a counterbalance to the EU.  Since then, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all been reluctant to draw themselves into Russia's sphere of influence again after seeing it's messy divorce with once-close ally Ukraine, and even those who have agreed to ascend are causing Russia significant headaches.  Kazakh fears over potential Russian aggression have lead to the severing of several mutual defence treaties, and it forging its own foreign policy route.  It blocked Armenia, a major recipient of Russian aid, from ascending, and along with Belarus refused to join Russia in banning food imports from the West.  It'll be interesting to see if in the long term the antagonism Russia is breeding ends up manifesting into something more than just a healthy skepticism of Russian intentions, but right now it is imperative that Western countries come to the aid of Ukraine before Russia is able to tear it in two.

Russia Is In a Perceptible Decline: Why Crimea Changes Nothing

"Cri-me-a-river."

In my last post I talked about Russian foreign policy (an admittedly mysterious subject) in light of Crimea, and the threat that Russia now posed to other eastern and central European states.  Russia without question is a powerful player in global politics, but do not make the mistake of equating that with a bright outlook for the country at home. 

Putin's approval ratings have hovered north of 80% in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, and has galvanized support for a more strong and assertive foreign policy.  Many analysts have remarked on how Putin has managed to grab the West by the balls, embarrassing the Obama administration by blatantly disregarding them on every issue from Syria to Iran.  Further, Europe's dependence on Russia for gas has crippled any possible sanctions regime for the short term at the very least.  In fact, "Russification"of the Crimean peninsula went ahead with much fanfare earlier this week, drawing a rather tepid response from the international community.

It's easy to imagine that there's a pretty euphoric atmosphere in the Kremlin right about now, and that probably is the case considering that they managed to pull of the annexation of a sovereign territory in the 21st Century without triggering a military response.  But it should not be, for the whole drama over the Crimea has only served to distract Kremlin functionaries from the grim realities that Russia faces from the near to long term.

The median age is buoyed by the 20-35 demographic

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, demographics have not been Russia's friend.  Its population peaked in 1991, and for the next decade saw rapid population decline as emigration, poor healthcare and violence in periphery regions took their toll.  Since then Russia's population has stabilized, and recently even experienced a net increase.  Even so, in coming years Russia will grapple with the same issues that Western countries will face in coming years, exacerbated by large scale emigration as well as poor healthcare and elevated poverty levels compared to the West.  While birth rates have recovered somewhat over the past decade, the median age in the country is 39.4, compared to 29.9 in Kazakhstan.  Already possessing an aging population this is set to worsen due to emigration, especially amongst young people in the country.  Economic collapse in the 1990s saw emigration surge, especially to western European countries  such as Germany and the UK, as well as other countries such as Israel.  A rapid increase in the average Russian income slowed the pace of emigration, and immigration from former Soviet states for the most part offset it.  The numbers are deceiving however.  In a poll conducted last year, nearly half of Russian students indicated a desire to leave the country, citing lack of economic opportunity and disillusionment with the political establishment.  Comparatively, the overwhelming majority of migrants that come from the former Soviet bloc are labourers who lack the academic background of the highly coveted migrants who are currently leaving Russia in droves.

Increasingly iced out, young Russians are looking abroad

 The emigration of the intellectual elite is nothing new to the country, with many prominent Russian liberals such as Sergei Guriyev and Garry Kasparov living in self imposed exile abroad.  What's different this time around are the numbers, having dramatically increased in recent years.  In fact, 2013 saw a 76% increase in political asylum requests compared to 2012, a meteoric rise that should it prove to be more than a statistical anomaly, could have dire consequences for the Russian economy.  The effects of the impending demographic "crash" that many countries have been well documented by academia.  Countries such as Canada, the U.S and large swathes of Europe as well as Japan all grapple with the issue of caring for an increasingly old population while drawing from a constantly shrinking tax base.  Russia, along with Japan is one of the few countries in the world that will most likely face a simultaneously shrinking and aging population, something that countries such as Canada have successfully countered by encouraging students, businessmen and young professionals from around the world (but predominantly Asia) to immigrate.

The economy is controlled by Oligarchs 

Now while the population might marginally decline, but is that the only trend with long term implications for Russia and this supposed decline?  On the surface, Russia's economy actually looks pretty solid.  Unemployment hovers around 5%, foreign debt is relatively low and the recession for the most part left Russia unscathed.  In fact, some might be surprised to know that the United States has a greater percentage of their population living under the poverty line (14.8%) compared to Russia (11.2%).  But this is somewhat of a Potemkin Village, for the Russian economy's structure is fundamentally different from the capitalistic liberal democracies of the west.  When the Soviet Union collapsed, the cash-strapped Russian state  instituted a controversial "Loan for Shares" program that ended up transferring control of SOEs (State Operated Enterprises) from the Russian government to shady nouveau-riche types, often with links to organized crime, who came out of seemingly nowhere to purchase heavily undervalued government assets at bargain basement prices.  Having paid marginal prices to acquire large swathes of Russian industry, this exclusive club of billionaires forged close ties with the Kremlin and through graft and corruption wrested control of the economy from the fledgling free market forces that were just gaining traction in the country.  As a result, Russia is now home to the greatest number of billionaires in the world.   While much noise has been made in the media about the close links between these robber barons and many top politicians, they're not exactly the patriotic type.

Capital flight has plagued the Russian state almost from its inception, with most wealthy Russians stashing their wealth abroad.  One only has to drive through London's most exclusive boroughs need to see the "Iceberg Homes" that many of Russia's ultra-wealthy have erected.  The Crimean invasion caused a spike in capital flight abroad, from $8 billion a month to roughly $70 billion during the first three months of the year.  As a result, the Russian economy is especially sensitive to shifts in the global economy geopolitical shocks, and why the continued decline of the ruble has many economists worried, despite the obvious boon it would be for Russia's large export based economy.  The large scale investments that Putin has unveiled to modernize the military, improve infrastructure and revitalize the economy are already taxing the Kremlin treasury, and a chronic decline in the value of the ruble does not bode well for a Russian economy that remains under the threat of sanctions.

What's important to consider is that Russia can be cursorily described as a hybrid petro-state and nuclear power, relying on revenues from oil exports to pay for the large (and often corruption riddled) "megaprojects" that have become a hallmark of Russian economic policy in recent years.  It is the largest exporter of oil in the world, and possesses its largest proven natural gas deposits.  While the financial and industrial sectors have sputtered, resource extraction has taken off, providing enough hard currency that allows Russia to maintain an exceptionally low debt as a percentage of the GDP, especially when compared to the U.K (88.7%).  Exporting upwards of 10 million barrels a day, mostly to the rest of Europe, also means that Putin could bring his rivals to the west to their knees with a turn of the spigot, and as a result has been granted an unusual degree of latitude in his geopolitical maneuverings.  But the leverage over his enemies that Putin enjoys may not last.  Many experts predict that an increase in overall production coupled with slowing growth in demand and lower extraction costs will lead to a long term decrease in the cost of oil.  Iraq has added 1 million barrels of production since 2007 and that number is expected to increase.  In response to the Crimean crisis, the United Kingdom had organized meetings seeking to wean Europe off of Russian oil and natural gas. Compounding this, between 1995 and 2005, spending on renewable energy sources (excluding large scale hydro) grew from $10 billion to $30 billion, and that number is only expected to increase as countries increasingly seek clean and sustainable alternatives to pricey fossil fuels.  Some economists disagree that this will put a damper on oil prices however, arguing that in response to lower prices some producers will cut back on production and shelve expansion plans, repeating the cycle of increased prices due to high demand versus low supply.  What they fail to consider is that over the last decade or so the energy landscape has changed dramatically, with some of the biggest energy companies in the world now SOEs such as Sinopec and Indian Oil, whose primary goals are not profit but rather securing long term energy sources for their countries' burgeoning and energy hungry populations.  Such companies would hardly cut production in the face of reduced prices, and in fact might be inclined to ramp it up.  Russia's ability to balance its budget is contingent upon the price of oil remaining at $117.  Should oil prices drop, the Russian economy would be negatively affected, as production is cut and drilling shelved.  Further Ukraine and various other countries which are currently essentially hostage to Russia due to their energy dependence on it will have alternatives not too far away as pipelines from Middle Eastern oil fields through Turkey can deliver oil and gas via Odessa.  Hence, oil may not prove to be as reliable a tool in the future as it has been in the past, both economically and politically.

Dark clouds are gathering over Russia

Russia's dramatic shift in foreign policy has led many political pundits in the West to laud Putin for rebuilding Russia, his grand vision central in revitalizing a country that was viewed by many as a crumbling state, in the throes of chronic decay.  And they may be partially right, for he has energized the electorate and set about reversing the damage that general neglect has rendered upon various parts of the country.  But Putin has hardly addressed some of the biggest issues facing his country, such as the de facto oligarchy, dependence on resource extraction and capital flight.  In fact in some areas Putin has exacerbated problems, presiding over widespread corruption, increasing international isolation and the emigration of Russia's youngest, bright and best in near-unprecedented numbers.  The long term prognosis for Russia looks grim, and annexing Crimea has done little to change that.      

Zero Sum Game: Putin's Imperial Crusade

Russian troops in Crimea

Things have moved very fast in Crimea.  Following the results of a widely condemned referendum in the Crimea where results showed that over 97% of voters chose to secede from Ukraine and instead join the Russian Federation.  While the results were almost immediately disavowed by a large majority of the international community, claiming that the referendum was conducted under intimidation and suppression by both Russian troops and the Crimean (as well as those from other nations) militias loyal to them, that did little to stop Russia from recognizing it.  Since then, Russia has solidified its de facto control of the region, with Ukraine withdrawing its 25,000 troops from the peninsula in an implicit sign that Kyiv recognizes its rather limited ability to assert control over the breakaway region.  The very next day, Russia’s lower house voted in favour of formally annexing it.  With Crimea in the Russian camp for the long term at the very least, what implications does it have for the rest of the former Soviet sphere?

Putin’s obsession with empire building is well documented.  Reasserting control over the former Soviet sphere has been an increasingly prominent policy goal of the Kremlin over the past decade.  But any doubts that remained should have been dispelled by Putin’s March 18th address to Parliament.  Denouncing what he deemed a centuries-long conspiracy by Western powers to suppress Russia, Putin heralded the dawn of a new era of Russian dominance, which was later christened by the Duma the very next day, who voted in favour of annexing the Crimean peninsula.  With its new doctrine of intervention on behalf of ethnic Russians that worked so successfully in the Ukrainian crisis, where will Putin go next?  Many point to Transnistria, a heavily industrialized breakaway region of the ethnic hodgepodge that is Moldova.  In response to the Duma vote to annex Crimea, the Transnistrian Parliament in turn passed a motion  to join the Russian Federation.  Some speculate that Russia may turn to Estonia and Latvia, both countries with substantial Russian populations in hopes of bringing them into its orbit or at the very least carving out Russian exclaves within them.  Regardless of whatever move the Kremlin does make, it’s fairly certain they will not stop with the Crimea.  Despite drawing strong condemnation from the international community and potentially alienating UN ally China, the biggest provocation in recent memory drew little in the way of firm consequences for Russia, and damaging sanctions do not seem likely any time soon.  Europe is heavily reliant upon Russia for energy, and that will not change anytime soon especially as many European countries move away from nuclear energy.  Russian-American trade is so diminutive that sanctions would have a rather limited impact.

So how do the events of recent weeks affect Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions?  The Russian dominated antithesis to the EU, the Eurasian Union, is set to become reality on New Year’s Day next year, with membership currently consisting of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, with Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all potentially joining as well.  While Russia’s annexation of Crimea provides it with the framework to take over other so-called “frozen” conflict zones, it also runs the risk of alienating other former Soviet states who may have been eyeing the union with wary interest.  While some states such as Poland and Lithuania voiced their desire to remain outside of any sphere of Russian influence by forging closer ties to NATO and the EU, countries such as Moldova and Armenia that could be compelled to join may look elsewhere, as evidenced by the rather lukewarm statements they issued in response to the annexation vote.  Russia’s newfound aggression is not the spontaneous combustion of a cocktail of nationalistic fervour at home and instability abroad but rather the culmination of a decade’s worth of meticulous planning.  Putin orchestrated various factors to create “the perfect storm” that would enable him to push his foreign policy agenda of restoring Russian domination in the region.   Harnessing the influence that the Russian Orthodox Church wielded over the population  in order to stoke nationalistic sentiments, rebuilding the Russian military as an effective fighting machine with a global reach, and influencing the affairs of other states in the post-Soviet sphere were all elements which enabled what unfolded on the peninsula to happen.  Putin took a calculated risk by invading Crimea, as its capture was an easy sell to the international community due to its traditional history as part of Russia as well as a litmus test of western appetites for Russian provocations.  It could not have hoped for a better result, and now count on the consolidation of Russian interests in the region to accelerate.

The picture does look particularly bleak, but what should the west do?  Sanctions may not be as effective as they have been in Iran (until recently), but the U.S and its allies do have a unique asset in NATO.  While it has seen a decade of general neglect, the 28-member military alliance is maybe the one tool in the U.S’s arsenal that Putin does fear.  When Poland, Latvia and the Czech Republic joined in 1999, Russia was wary of what it perceived to be creeping western influence beginning to encroach upon its own sphere of influence.  The U.S has dispatched naval forces to the Black Sea and a few days ago along with France announced it was sending sending air assets to Poland.  John McCain has stated that he wanted to see military equipment sent to Ukraine, and with leaders of former eastern bloc states becoming increasingly nervous about Russian activities, such a move would be easily defensible.  In fact, it might be prudent as ten day old Russian military exercises have led to a military buildup that NATO’s top commander described as “very, very sizable and very, very ready."  While it is desirable to avoid a “hot war”, it should not be avoided at all costs, lest the dovish policies of blind appeasement that failed spectacularly in the 1930s make a return.  While the situations are in no way parallels, there are some disturbing similarities that offer insight into how a potential conflict could be avoided.  

While on paper NATO countries (excluding the U.S and Canada) spent $269.736 billion on military expenditures and account for a significant chunk of global military spending, this is set to change with cuts to the militaries of most members.  The United States accounts for 70% NATO spending, and with some European members cutting spending up to 40%, it isn’t exactly unusual to hear some of the more fiscally conservative members of Congress complaining about how their European allies have been shoving the burden of defending them increasingly on the United States.  In the meantime, Putin has gone ahead with a vast and sweeping modernization program for the military that is estimated to cost somewhere in the neighbourhood of $770 billion dollars and will oversee the expansion of the air force, navy, special forces and intelligence capabilities.  While there has been some criticism about the realisticness of such an ambitious plan, such as the effect of corruption that is almost synonymous with massive projects in Russia, it nevertheless demonstrates the sincerity of Putin’s pledge to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.  Hearkening back to 80 years ago, one of the biggest draws of the upstart Nazi Party was its goal of restoring Germany to its former stature as a world power.  While illegal rearmament had begun from almost the moment that the Treaty of Versailles was signed, it was ramped up in the 30s under the direction of Hjalmar Schacht (notably never a member of the Nazi Party and later jailed at Dachau), the Reich Minister of Economics at the time.  Schacht successfully managed to create dummy companies that shielded rearmament efforts from prying Allied eyes.  From a force that was limited to a 100,000 ground army with no tanks, no air force and a navy of just 6 ships with no submarines, it was transformed in short order into a well oiled military machine that 20 years later would roll across Europe in a deadly “lightning war”, or Blitzkrieg.  

Now there are some stark differences in these situations (namely the Treaty of Versailles), but remaining oblivious to the military buildup occurring to the east is not a plausible or realistic plan of action for European countries seeking to avoid conflict.  While placing boots on the ground would be an obvious provocation and carries the risk of spilling over into armed conflict, NATO allies should begin by pledging to immediately provide Ukrainian forces with both arms and training in how to use them, as well as signing contracts for modern naval and air assets that could be paid for at a later date.  Although a UN mandate seems unlikely thanks to Russia’s status as a veto-wielding power in the Security Council, NATO forces should be deployed under its banner nonetheless with the sole purpose of securing the borders and maintaining the territorial integrity of countries who specifically have requested its assistance.  It may be met with protest from countries such as India who seem content to be willfully blind to the realities in the region, but ensuring that current tensions do not spill over into wider conflict demands that a principled stand against a Putin regime that has set its sights on nothing less than restoring the clout its old Soviet empire wielded be taken.  If Ukraine is further divided, it does not bode well for Eastern Europe at large.